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STARTING SOMETHING IN ASIA? 
In this issue of Timar Link we include 
the full text of the Statement published 
in Manila on November 18 by those 
who participated in the "Asia-Pacific 
Consultation on East Tim or". The 
event should be celebrated. 
Representatives from 13 countries and 
many different kinds of organisation 
attended the three days of intense 
work. Most of all, the meeting broke 
new ground. 
It was the first international meeting 
to be convened by and for Asian and 
Pacific groups to discuss East Timor. 
It was also the first such meeting to 
be held in ASEAN. Until this time, it 
has been virtuaUy out of the question 
to think of holding a conference on 
East Timar within any member 
country of ASEAN. 
The Conference should not therefore 
be valued for its direct political impact, 
which was small, but because it 
contains the seeds of future 
developments which might, over the 
long term, be enormously important 
for East Tim or. 
First of all, its success suggests that 
it may now be possible to raise East 
Timar as a serious public issue within 
the Asian-Pacific region - if not 
immediately, at least over a period of 
several years. It has also surely given 
new impetus to the work of several 
East Timar groups that are already in 
existence, in Japan, Australia, New 
Zealand and Hong Kong. Now others 
may take root - to start with, most 
probably in the Philippines and Papua 
New Guinea. The conference has 
vindicated the vision of a number of 
East Timor activists, particularly in 
Australia, who have been working 
patiently for several years with such a 
meeting in mind. 
What is at issue is of still wider 
importance than this, however. 
It is not merely a matter of bringing 
into play a new area of the world which 
has not been active on East Tim or. If 
the question of East Timor does not 
become an Asian issue, a Pacific issue, 
if it continues to be raised only or 
mainly by groups in the developed 
1 
industrial countries of the West, then 
it will become increasingly marginal. 
Europeans, North Americans and 
Australians may continue to protest, 
probably in dwindling numbers, but 
unless Asian and Pacific peoples are 
involved the issue will never return to 
the main political agenda. The 
Western governments still hold the 
power to secure a political settlement, 
by bringing Indonesia to the 
negotiating table; but they will never 
feel under pressure to do so, unless the 
demand for a settlement in Timar is 
given legitimacy from within the Asian 
and Pacific region. 
For all those concerned about East 
Timor, therefore, this conference -
seen as a small beginning to a long-
term venture - is one of the most 
important events of recent years. At 
issue, fundamentally, is the political 
relevance of what we are all doing, in 
our different attempts to secure justice 
and peace in the territory. 
ASIA·PACIFIC CONSULTATION ON EAST 
TIMOR - STATEMENT 
Delegates from 13 countries attended 
the first Asia - Pacific Consultation on 
East Timor, held in Manila, 
Philippines, 16-18 November 1987. 
Participants included representatives 
of the two Timorese political parties, 
UDT and Fretilin, officials of several 
International Church networks, 
human rights and development 
agencies and delegates from Asia, 
Pacific and European solidarity 
groups. 
The Consultation was convened to 
consolidate and expand emerging 
concerns on the issue within Asian and 
Pacific Churches and community 
organizations. 
ANALYSIS 
In its analysis of the issue the 
Consultation highlighted the following 
points: 
1. East Timor remains a major 
military problem for Indonesia. 
This is clear from the number of 
combat troops in the territory, the 
special command structures directly 
controlled from Jakarta, the tight 
internal security situation and 
continued denial of external access. 
2. The Indonesian presence in East 
Timor is not just a military 
occupation but is increasingly 
colonial in character. The economy 
is controlled by monopolies 
dominated by the Indonesian elite 
and social, cultural and political life 
has been structured to serve 
Indonesian interests at the expense 
of the East Timorese people who 
are systematically excluded, 
marginalised and powerless. 
3. Gross human rights violations 
continue with varying intensity. 
However it also needs to be 
recognized that the ever-present 
climate of fear, restrictions on free 
communication, legal rights, 
assembly and travel are now 
institutionalised in East Timor. The 
suppression of East Timorese 
culture and the systematic 
Indonesianisation of Timorese 
society also constitute an abuse of 
rights fundamental to the 
preservation of Timorese identity. 
4. Timorese armed resistance to 
integration remains seemingly 
indestructible and is a powerful 
symbol of East Timorese opposition 
to the annexation. However it also 
should be recognized that the less 
well known attitudes of East 
Timorese at all levels of society, 
including clergy, civil servants, 
students, and village people, are 
testimony that opposition to 
integration remains entrenched 
throughout East Timor. This is also 
reflected in the decision of the two 
major Timorese political parties, 
UDT and Fretilin, to work together 
in the political struggle for 
independence. 
5. The local Catholic Church has 
grown rapidly to become a mass 
organization to which most 
Timorese adhere. It is administered 
directly from the Vatican through 
an Apostolic Administrator and is 
not formally part of the Indonesian 
Church. The Timorese Church 
continues to call for an end to 
conflict and human rights abuses 
and for a just settlement, and for 
greater freedom to fulfil its heavy 
pastoral responsibilities. The 
Church is subjected to considerable 
political pressure, both externally 
and internally, and keenly feels its 
isolation. It needs increased support 
and contact particularly from the 
international church community. 
6. Western and regional economic, 
political, military and security ties 
with Indonesia constitute a major 
barrier to the advancement of the 
Timorese cause. Regionally this is 
exemplified in the interdependence 
of the Japanese and Indonesian 
economies, ASEAN political 
commitments to Indonesia, the 
active cooperation with Indonesia 
of other governments in the region 
particularly Australia and Papua 
New Guinea, and Indonesia's 
increasing drive to extend its 
political influence in the South 
Pacific. 
7. East Timor has not been voted on 
at the United Nations General 
Assembly since 1982 and Indonesia 
continues a major diplomatic and 
disinformation campaign to quash 
any discussion on the issue. 
Nevertheless East Timor remains 
an issue of active concern to a range 
of United Nations bodies and to 
many international and national 
forums, involving governments, 
political parties, parliaments, 
churches and non-governmental 
organizations. 
KEY AREAS FOR ACTION 
1. United Nations 
a. At its session in Geneva in February 
1988 the United Nations 
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Commission on Human Rights will 
consider the human rights situation 
in East Tim or. It is recommended 
that member states of the 
Commission, particularly those 
from Asia, be urged: 
* to support a continuing review by 
the Commission of the human rights 
situation in East Timor and 
* to endorse calls for the full 
participation of the East Timorese 
people in future United Nations 
sponsored talks on the issue. 
b. Talks on East Timor held between 
Indonesia and Portugal under the 
auspices of the United Nations 
Secretary General have not allowed 
for formal East Timorese 
participation. 
It is recommended that rep-
resentations to the Secretary-
General urging full Timorese 
participation be intensified. There 
will be no lasting settlement without 
Timorese cooperation. 
Such representations should also 
express dismay at the inadequacy 
of official United Nations reports 
on the issue. 
c. The United Nations Committee on 
Decolonization will hear petitions 
on East Timor in August 1988 in 
New York. 
It is recommended that strong NGO 
and government submissions be 
made, particularly from within the 
Asia-Pacific region. 
2. Portugal 
Ambiguity in recent statements on 
East Timor by the Portuguese 
Government, which has a major 
responsibility for ensuring a just 
settlement of the issue, is cause for 
alarm, as is Portugal's failure to ensure 
Timorese participation in the talks 
process. 
It is recommended that 
representations be made to the 
Portuguese Government on these 
failures. 
It is further recommended that 
expressions of concern on Portugal's 
role be made to Portuguese Church 
bodies, political parties and the 
Parliamentary Commission on East 
Timor. 
It is also recommended that Portugal 
be urged to recognize UDT and 
Fretilin and to materially support their 
work. 
3. The Church Because of the 
disputed political status of the 
territory, the Holy See has assumed 
direct responsibility for the Catholic 
Church of East Tim or. 
It is recommended that the Holy See 
be urged at every opportunity, 
particularly by Catholic bodies, to 
maintain its direct jurisdiction over the 
diocese of Dili until a just solution has 
been achieved based on the right of the 
people of East Timor to self-
determination. 
It is further recommended that the 
World Council of Churches and the 
international Protestant community be 
urged to dialogue directly with the 
Christian community in East Timor in 
a spirit of solidarity and common 
commitment to justice and peace. 
It is also recommended that churches 
be urged to sign the document 'East 




In time for the UN Human Rights 
Commission meeting, A Paz e Possivel 
em Timor-Leste has - compiled a 
complete list of reported arrests and 
human rights violations in East Timor 
from January 1985 to December 1987. 
In publishing the report, the authors 
recognise that, because of the almost 
unique conditions obtaining in East 
Timor, "it is impossible to check the 
level of accuracy of all information 
reaching us". They have relied upon 
three principal sources: private 
communications received through 
contacts in the Catholic church; 
documents produced by the Timorese 
resistance; and, finally, private 
communication with individuals, 
chiefly with refugees. 
Where information can be cross-
checked, it has proved broadly 
reliable. A recent issue of A Paz e 
Possivel newsletter, published in 
January-February, provides an 
illustration. 
According to Amnesty International 
reports and official Indonesian 
statistics, 72 Timorese have been tried 
and sentenced in the last two years. It 
turns out that the arrest of at least 30 
among these cases had already been 
reported independently by Fretilin and 
other sources. "Involuntarily," A Paz 
e Possivel concludes, "by bringing 
these prisoners up for trial, the 
Indonesian authorities have confirmed 
the reliability of information coming 
out of Timor along clandestine 
routes." 
The new report, which is 35 pages 
Jong, contains details of 991 cases - 249 
Timor: A Christian Reflection' as part 
of their overall effort of Christian 
education and advocacy on East 
Timor. 
IMPLEMENTATION 
The following broad action proposals 
were agreed to by the Consultation 
participants: 
1. The provision of basic information 
on the issue for the wider 
community; 
2. The regular information servicing 
of key non-governmental networks 
in Asia and the Pacific; 
3. The establishment of support 
networks in Papua New Guinea and 
the Philippines; 
4. Monitoring and lobbying of the 
principal non-UN political forums; 
in 1985, 694 in 1986 and 48 in 1987 
(for which year the list will be far from 
complete because of the long delays 
in transmission of information). 
The mass of evidence that this 
represents acquires still more 
significance when it is remembered 
that many cases are never reported. 
"The climate of terror which exists in 
the territory," they write, ". . . leads 
the immense majority of Timorese to 
keep silent, even among themselves, 
about the situation that faces them. 
"Refugees tell us that they have 
refrained from asking questions about 
members of their family who have 
been taken away by the military, or 
from visiting others who have been 
judged and sentenced for political 
reasons: to show interest in their fate 
could be enough to cause them too to 
fall under suspicion of rebellion. 
"When people from other towns 
come to Dili, as far as possible they 
avoid contacts even with members of 
their own family living in the capital, 
to make sure that neither are 
considered responsible for news that 
may appear about their home region." 
Grim reading 
The short text makes grim reading. It 
is an accumulation of individual 
tragedies, each recorded with a brief 
commentary that only hints at the 
terrible experiences described and the 
collective memory of suffering and 
endurance which the people of East 
Timor have been accumulating for 
more than a decade. For example: 
1985: "Francisco Belo, member of 
the resistance wounded and captured 
near Venilale, taken to the Hotel 
Flamboyant in Baucau from which he 
disappeared in January." 
1986: "Manu Rusu, young 
adolescent from Uabubo. Arrested on 
February 22 by 'Group 4', tortured 
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5. The documentation of the effects 
of the Indonesian occupation and 
colonization of East Timor on 
women and on children. 
6. The encouragement of human 
rights , humanitarian and other 
organizations to seek independent 
access to East Tim or. 
The Consultation participants sent 
messages of concern regarding East 
Timor to the Japanese, Philippines and 
Portuguese Governments and the 
United Nations Secretary-General. 
Messages of solidarity were sent to the 
Timorese people and the European 
and North American support network. 
It was resolved to reconvene at an 
appropriate time in the future . 
St. Theresa's College, Manila. 
18 November 1987 • 
with electric shocks, cigarette burns , 
stood two days in a tank of water up 
to the waist without food." 
1986: "Brigita Guterres, 25 years 
old, raped on November 3rd at 
Venilale by two soldiers from 
Company C, Batallion 516, when 
making her way to her vegetable plot." 
1987: "End of February/beginning 
of March, the whole population of 
Iliomar was threatened with death if 
any tears were shed during the 
execution of 17 civilians, killed with 
bayonets by 17 soldiers of the 9th 
Zipur Battalion on the orders of the 
Battalion commander. Among the 17 
who died: Jaime da Costa, 27, civil 
servant of Iliomar, Martinho Hornai, 
36, traditional chief of the same town." 
(Timor Oriental - Droits de I' Homme, 
Les Violations Continuent, published 
in French, may be obtained from A A 
Paz ePossfvel em Timor-Leste, clo 
CRC, rua Castilho, 61-2, Lisbon 1200, 
Portugal; or from East Timor News, 
rua Pinheiro Chagas, 77-2, Lisbon 
1000, Portugal.) 
Moises do Amaral 
A recent interview with Dr Moises do 
Amaral, published in Tapol's February 
issue, illustrates the density of 
suffering. Dr Do Amaral, leader of the 
Timorese Democratic Union (UDT), 
was not in East Timor when the 
invasion occurred. He has never been 
able to return. He described to Tapol 
what the war and Indonesian 
occupation has meant to his family and 
his community. 
"My parents had twelve children, 
of whom three died many years ago. 
Of the nine surviving brothers and 
sisters (including myself), I discovered 
that five died following the invasion 
so there were only three left apart from 
me, a sister in East Timor, a sister in 
Australia and a brother in East Timor. 
Also, only six nephews have survived. 
I also lost two half-brothers and many 
nephews and nieces. 
"I know my father died of starvation. 
I also know that my youngest brother 
was killed together with his wife. My 
mother also died because of the famine 
[of 1978-79 Eds.). A younger sister 
died because she refused to surrender 
to the Indonesian soldiers. She was 
only 22. Her name was Teresa. Two 
other brothers wanted to surrender 
but when she refused to surrender, 
they refused as well. 
"As for my father, he became weak 
and hungry . So he decided to try and 
reach a village to ask for help . He had 
one of his grand-daughters with him. 
But he did not have the strength to 
finish the journey so he sat down on a 
stone and they both died, there by the 
road. That was in 1978. After that, 
my brother surrendered in 1979, and 
then he was killed. 
"( ... )At the last census before the 
invasion, my clan consisted of almost 
600 persons, and there were about 
2,500 people in our tribe, the 
Fatuberliu tribe. My father was a liurai 
(clan chief). 
"Almost the entire clan has been 
wiped out. Only a few dozen people 
have survived. Some are living in Same 
and some in Dili. But many other clans 
from Fatuberliu have also completely 
disappeared. I think the reason for the 
heavy death toll is that in the early 
years of the occupation, from 1976 to 
1979, many people from other parts 
of the country fled to this region and 
took refuge there. Because of this, the 
Indonesians regarded our clan as 
highly suspect, people who should all 
be wiped out. 
"The region was also heavily bombed 
in the years up to 1979, so by 1980, 
there was almost no-one left. At that 
time, I asked the Red Cross if they 
could trace any of my relatives. They 
were not able to, and it was only later, 
when people from the region arrived 
in Portugal, that I heard what had 
happened." (From Tapol Bulletin, No 
85, February 1988.) 
Students in Fear 
In previous issues of Timor Link we 
have reported on the plight of the four 
Timorese students in Jakarta whose 
request for asylum, granted by Lisbon, 
has been frustrated since the end of 
1986 by the Indonesian authorities' 
refusal to grant them an exit visa. The 
four are still unable to leave and 
continue to wait, in difficult 
circumstances, for their case to make 
progress. 
Concern is now being expressed 
about the safety of other Timorese 
students, dispersed in universities and 
colleges in many parts of Indonesia. 
Many of them have been under 
surveillance; now, it seems, some of 
those who are believed by the 
authorities to sympathise with 
Timorese nationalism are being 
physically threatened. 
East Timor News (Urgent 
Communique No.1, February 15 1988) 
reports on the fears of many of these 
students following the deaths of two 
students in circumstances they believe 
to be suspicious. 
In May 1987, first of all, a politically 
active student from Los Palos, 
studying at the Agricultural Institute 
of Semarang in central Java, was found 
dead inside a well. 
The second death took place in 
December 1987. Jose Antonio Moniz 
da Silva, a mature student attached to 
the Faculty of Co-operative Economy 
at the Karamala Institute in Jogjakarta 
was reported to have been killed on 
the morning of December 15 when he 
ran over a child on his motorcycle. 
Suspicion about the incident has grown 
among Timorese students, because no 
witnesses have come forward, and the 
child in question has not been 
identified. Reports suggest that Mr da 
Silva sustained only one injury, to the 
back of his head. 
It is known that after Jose da Silva 
wrote a critical report about East 
Timor to Governor Carrascalao in July 
1987 (following his request for input 
from students), he was visited by Dr 
Amarudin, head of public services in 
Dili. Jose da Silva was told a 
Commission from Jakarta would be 
coming in December to question him. 
Some students have concluded that 
Mr da Silva's report was intercepted 
by the secret services and that they 
were responsible for his death. 
Other students have been arrested 
and detained. One, Germano da Silva, 
a student of Public Administration 
who was arrested while on holiday in 
Dili in October 1986, is still detained 
by the military in Dili. 
Timor Polled 
East Timor News (Monthly Memo 
No.7, December 1987) also reports 
that during the first half of 1987 the 
Indonesian authorities secretly 
monitored public attitudes in East 
Tim or, by use of informers and secret 
agents. Students and civil servants 
were particularly targeted, according 
to the reports. 
The purpose of the exercise was to 
gauge the degree of Timorese support 
for, or opposition to, integration 
within Indonesia. The results were 
apparently very clear. 
A very high proportion of Timorese, 
the survey concluded, opposed 
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Indonesia's presence in East Timor. 
The students, in particular, are openly 
critical. Attitudes in the civil service 
are more divided, between those who 
avoid political involvement or 
conversation about political matters, 
those who are outwardly pro-
Indonesian but 'seem afraid' and those 
who speak in favour of progress but 
remain silent about their attitude 
towards integration with Indonesia. 
(The Monthly Memos may be 
obtained upon request from East 
Timor News do Rua Pinheiro Chagas, 
77-2, 1000 Lisbon, Portugal.)• 
New Cabinet 
On March 10, President Suharto was 
returned unopposed for a fifth five-
year term as President of Indonesia. 
On March 22, he announced the 
Cabinet that will take Indonesia into 
the 1990s. Half its members are new, 
reflecting the view that a new 
generation must be given experience 
of high office. 
Two appointments are of particular 
interest for those who watch 
Indonesian policy towards East Timor. 
Firstly, in the Foreign Ministry, 
Moch tar Kusumaatmadja has 
departed, as expected. His 
replacement is the able Ali Alatas, 
very well known to Portuguese 
diplomats and all who follow East 
Timor, because as Ambassador to the 
United Nations he orchestrated 
Indonesia's effective diplomatic 
campaign in New York. Aged 55, Mr 
Ali Alatas can be expected to sharpen 
up Indonesia's international 
diplomacy. 
General 
Murdani • • • The second significant move concerns 
General Benny Murdani, who has 
been appointed Minister of Defence. 
Often described as the second most 
powerful man in Indonesia, General 
Murdani announced that he would be 
stepping down as armed forces' 
commander at the beginning of 
February. 
This position is being filled by the 
present Army chief, General Try 
Sutrisno. 
General Murdani is not apparently 
diluting his power in the military, 
however: it is announced that he will 
continue to retain command over 




General Murdani's interest m East 
Timor is not apparently waning, 
however. Organiser of the original 
invasion, for some years directly 
responsible for the territory's 
'pacification', he is still Chairman of 
East Timor's Development 
Committee, and his public image as 
the regime's strongman is inseparably 
associated with the war there. 
On Christmas Day 1987, as has 
DOCUMENT 
become his custom, General Murdani 
(who is a practising Roman Catholic) , 
visited the troops in East Tim or. In a 
subsequent statement, he once again 
informed journalists that Indonesia 
will accept the surrender of guerrillas . 
He denied that Indonesia has "any 
intention of converting the local 
(Catholic) community to Islam" and 
said that the East Timorese "are free 
to conduct religious services according 
to their free will, according to their 
religious teaching." 
Speaking of the resistance, General 
Murdani assessed guerrilla strength at 
some 500. This figure is the same as 
Fixing Foreign Visits: 
Secrets from 1976 
A remarkable document recently came 
into the hands of A Paz e Passive! em 
Timor-Leste in Lisbon. We publish 
extracts from it below. 
It was held in secret for twelve years, 
inside East Timor, by an official in the 
Timorese civil service, and was finally 
smuggled across the border into West 
Timor, hidden under the floor carpet 
of a car. 
Many allegations have been made 
over the years about the different 
techniques used by the Indonesian 
authorities to ensure that foreign 
visitors leave East Timor with a 
favourable impression. Here is 
documentary proof of that 
manipulation. 
Written in Portuguese on three 
sheets, the document contains the 
instructions that officials received in 
advance of the expected arrival of Mr 
Guicciardi, special representative of 
the United Nations Secretary General, 
who attempted to visit the territory at 
the beginning of 1976. (Mr Guicciardi 
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that he put forward three years ago. 
This year, however, he also 
acknowledged that the conflict is 
unlikely to end soon. "It may take 
several more years to clean them all 
out," he told Reuters. 
On the arms possessed by the 
resistance movement , General 
Murdani said: "Some of them are 
armed with weapons, some are not . 
Their weapons are already outdated . 
Only between 10 and 11 per cent of 
their weapons were obtained from our 
soldiers." (Jakarta Post, December 31 
1987). 
eventually gave up, after repeated 
Indonesian obstruction.) 
The document has not been 
professionally validated, but there is 
no reason to suppose that it is not 
genuine. 
Komando Tugas Gabungan 
Comando Resort Militer 
Guidelines regarding contacts with the 
UN Delegation 
1. General 
1. Results of the meeting with 
Colonel SOEBIJAKTO, ASS.V 
DEFENCE DEPARTMENT on 
preparations for the visit to East 
Tim or by the UN delegation. 
2. It is necessary to give proper 
instructions to the Territorial Units, 
particularly those in KASI-5 which 
have the job of orienting the 
Provisional Government in the 
Districts, and also the Political 
Parties and the District Legislative 
Assemblies. 
3. It is most important that uniform 
replies be given to the various 
questions the delegation may put. 
4. Members of the Provisional 
Government should be properly 
briefed, since, because of their 
position, they will be approached 
by members of the aforesaid 
delegation. 
2. Questionnaire (Questions and 
Replies) and Tasks to Carry Out 
5. It must be made clear that the 
Provisional Government now 
exercises full governing powers, and 
is therefore the body whose duty 
and right it is to deal with the 
delegation on all matters relating 
to East Timor. All other military 
or civilian authorities should remain 
out of view during the delegation's 
stay. 
6. All members of the Armed Forces 
stationed in the town will continue 
to carry out their duties, but must 
nevertheless wear civilian dress so 
that it should appear to the 
Delegation that they are unarmed 
civilians. 
7. All members of the military 
disguised as unarmed civilians must 
avoid any contact or conversation 
with the delegation . 
8. All sites occupied by the Armed 
Forces or already abandoned by 
them must show no indication 
(weapons, munitions, notices) 
which might betray their presence 
or movement through such 
localities . Roads must be cleaned 
and free of military equipment. 
9. It is expressly forbidden for any 
personnel to move through the 
streets bearing any sign or marking 
that indicates that they are 
members of the armed forces . That 
is , it is recommended once again 
that the only military personnel who 
should appear in the streets are 
those who are to all appearances 
civilians. The population should be 
told that they have nothing to fear 
and should continue their daily lives 
normally. 
10.The places which will probably be 
visited are Oe-Cussi, Dili, Atauro, 
Baucau and Manatuto. Aileu, 
Balibo, Maliana, Lospalos and 
Laga might be visited later. It is 
extremely important to make sure 
that the Delegation does not spend 
the night at any of these places, 
and , if members of the Delegation 
should desire to do so, the 
Provisional Government must 
firmly oppose the idea, finding any 
pretext. If the Delegation should 
want to visit any area that is still 
subject to military activity the 
Provisional Goverment must 
refuse, advancing as justification 
the very bad state of the roads, bad 
weather conditions for flying, or the 
reluctance of the communities living 
in these areas to meet the 
Delegation because of the bad 
treatment they have received at the 
hands of FRETILIN. 
11.The leaders of the local parties, i.e. 
APODETI, UDT, KOTA and 
TRABALIST A , should be well-
briefed to enable them to inform the 
UN Delegation about the following 
points: 
a) FRETILIN's activity is communist 
in character because it has 
generated terror, threats , torture 
and destruction; 
b) FRETILIN in reality was 
dominated by activists who came 
deliberately from Portugal , sent by 
Potuguese government , and under 
communist influence, and Rogerio 
Lobato 's visit to Lisbon and the 
communist countries was assisted 
by the Portuguese government; 
c) Avoid stating that all Fretilin 
supporters are communists since the 
majority consist of people who 
know nothing of communism, but 
who were unwittingly deceived by 
the leaders of FRETILIN; 
d) Find out the weak points of the 
Provisional Government and do as 
much as possible to deal with this 
problem; 
e) Guide the choice of the people 's 
representatives in the Legislative 
Council so that these are genuinely 
acceptable to the people. 
[Paragraphs 11-28 provide answers 
to be given to questions about East 
Timor's political parties, the number 
of combatants, social and cultural 
conditions, the reasons why the 
Provisional Government refused 
Australian aid, and its plans for the 
future. Eds.] 
29 .What treatment is given to 
prisoners of war and how many are 
there? 
(Reply) 
a . Indicate some building that might 
serve as a prison, which must be 
guarded by sentries whose weapons 
are not primed to fire. 
b. Select some sensible people, 
particularly from among the armed 
forces, to play the role of prisoners 
of war who have already 
surrendered to our troops and who 
are being well treated. 
c. To ensure realism, rations should 
be improved and those playing the 
part of prisoners must fulfil their 
role scrupulously. 
d. Prisoners' answers must be in line 
with the Government's instructions, 
notably in regard to the total 
number of prisoners held, their 
good treatment and the 
improvement they experience in 
their conditions as the situation 
returns to normal. 
30.What are the Provisional 
Government's plans regarding the 
Chinese? 
(Reply) 
a. The Provisional Government 
recognises only one China, and 
b. Continues to respect the rights of 
the Chinese, and will offer them 
greater opportunities to work in the 
commercial sector. 
31.To make sure that political leaders 
do not contradict one another in 
front of the UN Delegation, those 
who are to meet the Delegation 
must be selected, thereby avoiding 
the possibility that they might 
betray the principle of Integration 
within Indonesia. 
32.What is the Provisional 
Government's programme for 
integration within Indonesia? 
(Reply) 
a . We are going to introduce a new 
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educational system for the new 
generation , as has been done for the 
Indonesian people , that is, a united 
people with a national language, 
and maintain the policy of good 
neighbourliness with other peoples 
( . . . ) 
b. If necessary we have sufficient 
funds to finance the process of self 
determination. 
331n what state are East Timor's 
economic infrastructures? 
(Reply) The Portuguese government 
did nothing for the development of 
East Timor, for example as regards 
roads , bridges etc. All-weather roads 
exist only in Dili and there are none 
anywhere else; there are few bridges 
and, since most rivers lack them, 
crossing is difficult particularly in the 
rainy season. 
34Are there or are there not some 
Australian journalists in Timor, and 
if so where are they? 
(Reply) We have never seen a foreign 
journalist in Timor, so we know 
nothing about this matter. 
35 Js the presence of the Communist 
Front in Timor still necessary? 
(Reply) The presence of the 
Communist Front in east Timor is not 
necessary because the people are 
Catholic and , since their religious 
conviction is very deep, they respect 
and recognise the existence of God. 
36.When the UN Delegation arrives it 
is not necessary to prepare a 
welcome by the people because the 
provisional Government has 
vehemently rejected the UN's 
interference in East Timor's 
internal affairs. 
Banners of protest against UN 
interference should be prepared, 
such as the following: 
a. UNITED NATIONS HANDS OFF 
TIM OR TIMUR IS TIM OR*. 
b.WE ARE ALREADY 
INTEGRATED WITH INDON-
ESIA.* 
c. EAST TIMOR PEOPLE ARE 
INDONESIAN NOW.* 
d. UNITED NATIONS WE DO NOT 
WANT YOUR INTERVENTION 
HERE* 
e. And others. 
37 .When the UN Delegation arrives, 
every element of the Indonesian 
Armed Forces should be duly 
advised to carry out precisely the 
instructions set out above. 
Office of the Provisional Government 
in Dili, January 16 1976. 
Secretary to the Provisional 
Government 
Zeca Araujo 
* Written in English (as reproduced 
here) in the original. Eds. • 
THE CHURCH INSIDE 
Father Felgueiras 
According to reports, Father Joao 
Felgueiras, SJ, was still held up in 
Jakarta during February, waiting for 
permission to return to East Timor. 
Readers will remember (TL 10, July 
1987) that last year Fr. Felgueiras was 
the subject of some controversy when, 
for family reasons, he came out of 
East Timor for the first time since 
1975. It was reported that he would 
not be authorised to return. A similar 
threat hung over the future of a second 
Portuguese priest, Fr. Jose Martins , 
who has also been teaching at the 
junior seminary in Dili. 
At the end of October 1987, 
however, after extensive discussions. 
Fr. Felgueiras learned that he would 
not be prevented from continuing his 
service in the territory . 
The exact chain of events, and its 
significance, is unclear ; nor can we say 
whether the new delay implies that Fr. 
Felgueiras' return is again in question. 
It does appear, however, that the 
decision originally taken last year were 
reversed. 
In a series of separate statements, 
Mgr Belo, the Apostolic 
Administrator, the Indonesian 
authorities, and the Indonesian Jesuit 
provincial, Fr. Darminto, each 
affirmed that they had no wish to stand 
in the way of Fr. Felgueiras' return . 
According to East Timar News 
Memo No.5), however, Jesuit sources 
are said to have confirmed that Fr. 
Felgueiras is to work under the 
authority of the Portuguese Jesuit 
Provincial . 
This might be the key development. 
In 1986, Jesuits living in East Timor 
were asked to place themselves under 
the Indonesian Provincial, having been 
governed directly from Rome since 
1975, under a provisional arrangement 
that took account of East Timor's 
exceptional situation . 
An important principle is at stake 
here. It affects all the Jesuits in East 
Timor, not merely those who are of 
Portuguese nationality. It is reported 
that the Jesuit General, Fr. 
Kolvenbach , has taken the case in 
hand personally, and reports claim 
that Fr. Felgueiras himself is due to 
return to Rome in April to present the 
arguments of the Jesuits in East Timor 
before their superiors in Rome.• 
Clergy Needed - Must be with the people 
Mgr Belo, Apostolic Administrator in 
East Timor, has asked Religious 
Orders in Indonesia to help fill 
shortages of personnel in his diocese. 
A Paz e Poss{vel (December 1987) 
reports the request, which was 
circulated during the August meeting 
of Indonesian Major Religious 
Superiors by its Secretary, Fr. 
Djikstra. 
The shortage of personnel is not a 
new problem; but Mgr Belo's anxiety 
about it is compounded by rapid 
population growth and also by the 
long-term presence of Islam. Some 34 
teachers from Saudi Arabia have been 
given permission to settle in East 
Timor, and the document expresses 
fears that, unless new clergy arrive in 
the next four or five years, irreversible 
damage will be done to the church's 
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standing. 
The request also records that, 
whereas most of the Canossian and 
Carmelite Sisters in the territory are 
Timorese, the Indonesian orders 
which have begun working in East 
Timor since 1975 (St . Charles 
Borromeo, Queen of the Rosary, St. 
Ursula Sisters and the Servants of the 
Holy Spirit) have not attracted any 
Timorese aspirants . 
It is known that some of the 
Indonesian religious are not popular 
among the Timorese. 
The document alludes to why this is, 
in affirming that religious from 
Indonesia should come "in a spirit of 
inculturation: to see with the eyes of 
the people, to love with the heart of 
the people, and to co-operate with the 
people." 
"New pastoral methods must accord 
with the situation and condition of 
local believers," it goes on. "Pastoral 
methods must be used which 
correspond to the aspirations of the 
people, the Church and local 
believers." 
The authors of the request describe 
East Timor's political situation with 
bleak economy. "One can say," they 
write, "that in East Timor two forces 
are in conflict: our brothers in the 
mountains, of the maquis, who remain 
firmly committed to their objectives, 
and our brothers who have come to 
establish order. Result: the 
government's position is more military 
than civilian." 
(Quotations are translated from the 
French text of A Paz e Poss{vel. Eds.)• 
Pope Reaffirms Concern, Doubts Remain 
"The church's universal mission of 
service leads her to hope that particular 
consideration will be given to the 
protection of the ethnic, religious and 
cultural character of the people of East 
Timar." 
With these words, addressed 
publicly to the new Indonesian 
Ambassador at the Vatican on 
December 14 1987, Pope John Paul II 
reaffirmed the Vatican's continued 
concern about the situation in East 
Tim or. In this issue, we look at why 
some observers hesitate to say where 
the Vatican really stands. 
On December 14 the Pope was 
echoing almost exactly remarks he 
made in July 1984, when he received 
the credentials of Ambassador Roni 
Hendrawan Kuniardi's predecessor, 
General Sastrapoespita. 
On that occasion, he stated that "the 
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Holy See continues to follow the 
situation in East Timor with 
preoccupation and with the hope that 
particular consideration will be given 
in every circumstance to the ethnic , 
political and cultural identity of the 
people. " 
His recent remarks have served to 
remind Indonesia that East Timor 
remains an issue for the Vatican. The 
Pope was not provoked, as he was in 
Mgr da Costa Lopes with Pope John Paul II 
1984, into making his remarks. 
Diplomats were reported to have been 
surprised by his intervention. 
The Indonesian government reacted 
with predictable sharpness. Foreign 
Minister Mochtar Kusumaatmaja said 
that the Pope was not well briefed. 
"The Pope is one-sidedly informed .. 
. Local culture is not endangered at 
all," he told journalists (Jakarta Post, 
17.12.87). 
Governor Mario Carrascaliio, 
though not referring directly to the 
Pope's remarks, also stated in a speech 
on December 20 that the Indonesian 
government had never threatened 
Timorese culture . 
Franz Seda, a member of the 
Pontifical Commission for Justice & 
Peace who has strongly defended 
Indonesia's record in the territory, also 
commented at length. Formerly a 
government minister, Mr Seda claimed 
that "the remarks reflect a positive 
attitude on the part of the pope 
towards Indonesia, because John Paul 
II is speaking to us and discussing 
(East Timor) with us and not with 
Portugal or the United Nations ." 
(UCA News, No. 433, December 23 
1987.) 
Vatican Attitudes 
The incident illustrates the importance 
which diplomatic opinion attaches to 
the Catholic church's attitude towards 
the Timor question and also the 
uncertainties which veil that attitude. 
Official statements, predictably 
diplomatic in phrasing, have been 
variously used to assert that the 
Vatican supports the East Timorese 
cause, and, conversely, that it is ready 
to recognise the Indonesian 
occupation as soon as the diplomatic 
balance shifts decisively in favour of 
Jakarta. 
The truth, no doubt, is considerably 
more complicated than either of these 
interpretations. 
It is generally recognised that 
opinion is divided among those who 
advise on policy. In particular, there 
are those who understand, and have 
sympathy for, the perspective of the 
Timorese church, and those - generally 
more conservative, perhaps more 
powerful - who are more preoccupied 
by the need to preserve the Catholic 
church's long-term interests in 
Indonesia. It is not necessary to 
assume that both these views cannot 
to some extent be held at the same 
time. 
Proponents within the church of both 
sides - the Indonesian nationalist and 
the Timorese nationalist positions - are 
able to obtain access to the highest 
level within the Vatican. Indonesian 
views are represented through 
members of the Indonesian Catholic 
Bishops' Conference, and such figures 
as Mr Seda. The Vatican's diplomatic 
representative in Jakarta (the Pro-
N uncio) is also assumed to be a 
channel of influence: although the 
Pro-Nuncio represents both Indonesia 
and East Timor (which the Vatican 
administers separately), it is the 
experience of observers that the last 
two Pro-Nuncios have shown 
s~mpathy for the Indonesian point of 
view. 
On the Timorese side, Mgr da Costa 
Lopes and, to a greater extent, Mgr 
Belo have been able to speak directly 
to high Vatican officials and meet Pope 
John Paul II himself. Since the diocese 
of Dili is administered directly from 
Rome, there is regular written 
correspondence. In addition, senior 
representatives of the religious orders 
serving in East Timor - notably the 
Salesians and Jesuits - are kept 
well-informed of the situation in the 
territory. 
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Such evidence as there is suggests 
that the Vatican is not only well 
informed but has an agreed private 
assessment of the facts regarding East 
Timor's recent history . A couple of 
years ago it was certainly taken for 
granted at very high level that extreme 
violence has occurred, that economic 
deprivation was serious, that 
Indonesia's presence has been 
associated with abuses of human rights 
and corruption, and that the people of 
the territory have been widely 
alienated as a result. 
A Political Pivot 
The Vatican is, of course, a state as 
well as the centre of Catholic 
authority. The Vatican is subject to 
representations and pressures from 
governments. It has been consulted in 
relation to the talks between Portuga~ 
and Lisbon sponsored in New York 
by Mr Perez de Cuellar. The 
Indonesian government would love to 
welcome John Paul II to Indonesia - a 
visit he has already deferred, at least 
in part because of the Timor conflict. 
For its part, Portugal has attached 
particular importance to support from 
Rome. For several years in the early 
1980s, the Catholic church seemed to 
be one of Lisbon's few independent, 
credible allies on the issue. The 
Portuguese Prime Minister, Cavaco 
Silva, visited Rome in October, soon 
after his re-election, and certainly 
raised the matter of East Timor when 
he did so. 
It is far from certain that he obtained 
the assurances he was seeking, 
however. While it is not surprising that 
no public statement or commentary 
was issued after the talks, Portuguese 
officials have been noticeably 
downbeat recently in speaking of their 
diplomacy in regard to the Catholic 
church. 
Statecraft or Divided Counsel? 
However one looks at it, the signals 
sent out by Rome have been 
consistently ambiguous, allowing both 
Portugal and the Indonesian 
government - as well as the Timorese 
and Indonesian churches - to draw 
comfort for their point of view. Is a 
detectable drift now taking place, in 
favour of Indonesia's point of view? It 
still remains almost impossible to say 
- not least because in Timor itself the 
Catholic church is passing through a 
period of difficulties. From 1981 until 
1985 the Timorese church was able to 
speak out, intermittently but with 
conviction, in the name of its people. 
For some months now, it has been 
almost silent. Though many factors 
may be involved, not least among the 
causes is the beleaguered position of 
the Apostolic Administrator, Mgr 
Belo. Extreme pressure has been 
brought to bear on him by the 
Indonesian authorities, and he is also 
faced by opposition to him within the 
diocese. Given that he is the only 
figure in the Timorese church with 
direct access to the highest levels of 
the Vatican, his loss of authority will 
certainly have reduced the influence 
of pro-Timorese voices in Rome. 
The Pro-Nuncio Bends Light 
A good example of Rome 'bending 
light' in relation to Timor was given 
recently by the current Pro-Nuncio, 
Mgr Francesco Canalini, interviewed 
at length by Pembaruan in September 
1987. As quoted in the article, Mgr 
Canalini set out very carefully the logic 
of the Vatican's diplomatic position 
with regard to East Timor, but dwelt 
lightly upon or omitted to mention the 
church's publicly-stated concern about 
human rights abuses, humanitarian 
needs and Timor's political identity. 
Some of these issues are matters which 
the Indonesian Catholic church has 
itself raised. 
Mgr Canalini stated, quite correctly, 
that while the conflict in Timor 
remains unresolved, the Vatican 
would not take sides but "awaited a 
settlement in accord with international 
law". He explained the Vatican would 
not transfer East Timor from its 
"Europe" to its "Asia" department, 
because to do so "would implicitly 
constitute recognition of the 
Indonesian dimension" and pre-empt 
an eventual settlement. 
The same reasoning lies behind the 
Vatican's refusal to integrate the 
diocese of Dili within the Indonesian 
Bishops' Conference. 
Mgr Canalini then went on, however, 
to say that in practical terms the 
problem was only a legal one -because, 
for example, Mgr Belo attends 
meetings of the Indonesian Bishops' 
Conference and the diocese of Dili 
runs development programmes in co-
operation with the Indonesian 
Bishops' Conference. 
As it stands, this argument is deeply 
disturbing. It implies that, for the 
Vatican, no issues of substance lie at 
the heart of its refusal to adopt 
Indonesia's point of view over the 
issue. Such a conclusion is at odds with 
the public and private view of the 
Vatican, as expressed by the Pope -and 
a number of Bishops' Conferences. 
Moreover, such a view funda-
mentally trivialises the significance of 
the Vatican's commitments to 
international law. It suggests that it is 
merely for reasons of procedural 
formality - or worse, administrative 
habit - that Rome will wait for the 
Mgr Belo 
international community to resolve 
this dispute before defining its policy. 
No weight is given to the moral and 
political principles which underpin the 
Timor conflict, and upon which 
international law and Timor's demand 
for justice depend. 
"Asked if there were a problem in 
Indonesia-Vatican relations after East 
Timor was integrated into Indonesia, 
Mgr Canalini hesitated, seemed to be 
trying to remember, and finally said 
'Nooo'. But the Vatican had once 
conveyed a statement of concern 
connected with human rights. He 
quickly added that the situation had 
very much improved. The Vatican 
always had to be careful there not be 
anything contrary to human rights. 
'Compared with the past, of course, the 
human rights situation is better."' 
(Quote from a summary of the 
Pembuaran article, in Indonesia News 
Service, No.37, 7.10.87.) 
It is easy to detect the shallowness 
of a diplomatic position that - as set 
out in this article - is markedly less 
principled than that of governments 
in the European Community. In more 
formal circumstances, one assumes the 
Vatican's presentation would be 
intellectually more impressive. 
Even if that is so, we cannot take it 
for granted that nothing has altered. 
Pope John Paul II did not reaffirm last 
December exactly what he told the 
Indonesian Ambassador in July 1984. 
His remarks were significantly less 
demanding upon the Indonesian 
authorities. Nowhere was the 
Vatican's attitude described by any 
word as strong as "pre-occupied". 
Above all, gone in 1987 was the 
reference to concern for the territory's 
political identity. 
Were these words and these absences 
chosen? The people of Timor can only 





The Fourth Christian Consultation was 
held in Lisbon in January , sponsored 
by Portuguese Pax Christi , the 
Presbyterian Evangelical Church of 
Portugal, A Paz e Poss{vel em Timor-
Leste and CIIR. It was attended by 
representatives of Christian 
organisations from six European 
countries and the United States, as 
well as a sizeable number of 
representatives from Portugal, and 
followed up three previous meetings 
held in Holland and Geneva. As in the 
past, the meeting, which lasted from 
Friday January 22 to Sunday January 
24, was private. No report will be 
distributed. 
The Lisbon meeting offered the 
foreign participants a rare opportunity 
to meet directly with members of the 
Timorese community in Lisbon. On 
the Saturday morning four refugees 
spoke formally to the meeting, 
describing their experiences in East 
Timor after 1975. The meeting then 
broke up into small groups for 
informal discussion between 
participants and larger groups of 
Timorese. 
This direct contact enriched the 
atmosphere of the meeting very 
significantly, and for many who took 
part it was a moving experience. 
On Sunday afternoon, the delegates 
visited the refugee camp at Balteiro, 
on the outskirts of Lisbon, where 
Timorese from all over the capital had 
gathered to welcome them, with a 
meal and performances of Timorese 
music and dances. 
The Conference also met 
representatives of Fretilin and the 
UDT, who made a joint presentation 
on Saturday evening. 
The Consultation was widely covered 
by the Portuguese media, and on the 
Monday following the Consultation 
some of those who took part met with 
advisers to President Mario Soares, 
members of the recently appointed 
Parliamentary Commission on East 
Timor and officials at the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. A group was also 
received by the Secretary to the 
Archbishop of Lisbon. 
A fifth meeting will take place, but 
a date and place have not yet been 
confirmed. For further information, 
readers may contact one of the three 
organisations which have agreed to 
sponsor it: CIIR in London, A Paz e 
Poss{vel in Lisbon (Rua Castilho 61-2-
Dto, 1200 Lisbon), and Netherlands 
Justice & Peace Commission 






Eukumindo - the European Working 
group for Ecumenical Relations with 
Indonesia - is an association of 
protestant churches and mission 
organisations. Its members include 
organisations from West Germany, the 
Netherlands, Switzerland, the United 
Kingdom, and the Community of 
Churches in Indonesia (PGI). In 
December, Eukumindo published, in 
German, the draft of an important 
position paper on East Tim or, which 
is reviewed here by Robert Archer. 
A New Direction 
In previous issues we have signalled 
the appearance of ground-breaking 
statements on East Timor by the 
United States National Council of 
Churches in Christ (ETL 10, July 1987) 
and the Uniting Church in Australia 
(ETL 11, November 1987). 
The publication of a third document, 
this time by an international 
association rather than a national 
body, confirms that the Protestant 
churches are indeed adopting a new 
approach in their handling of this 
acutely sensitive issue. 
Put most simply, whereas Protestant 
church organisations have preferred 
since 1975 to be silent in public about 
East Timor in order to dialogue in 
private with their Indonesian partners, 
some of these organisations are now 
continuing that dialogue on the basis 
of carefully presented position papers 
that set out their point of view. 
In part this is a response to concern 
within their own churches and in their 
countries. To a greater degree, it 
seems to be due to recognition that 
private dialogue with Indonesian 
church partners has not brought about 
change. Moreover, the dialogue itself 
has been painful and frustrating, 
continued in the teeth of Indonesian 
resistance to open-ended discussion. 
The statements that have been 
published face up to this difficulty in 
different ways. The NCCC-USA chose 
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to present a painstaking historical 
summary of the facts, which 
demolishes the official Indonesian 
analysis without ever making direct 
reference to it. The Uniting Church, 
in contrast, opted to challenge the 
assumptions about the obligations of 
partnership which have underpinned 
the Protestant churches' reticence 
since 1975. 
All the statements nevertheless make 
considerable effort to comprehend the 
views of their Indonesian church 
partners. In general, these have been 
expressed forcefully. In many 
instances, discussion has been vetoed 
altogether, on the grounds that East 
Tim or is an internal domestic matter. 
In fact the official Indonesian 
Protestant presentation of events since 
1975 has followed closely the official 
analysis of the Indonesian government 
- though some Indonesians who visit 
the territory regularly may 
acknowledge privately that all is by 
no means well . 
Eukumindo 
Of the three, Eukumindo has the 
longest and most intimate relationship 
with Indonesia. Most of its members 
are Indonesian-speaking and have 
lived for years in the country. Very 
understandably they sympathise with 
Indonesian perceptions of their own 
history, and give considerable weight 
to the cultural factors conditioning 
that perception. As a result, many 
Eukumindo members would tend to 
disown criticisms of Indonesia which 
impose "Western" assumptions on 
Indonesian social and political 
processes. This position is held the 
more strongly, again very 
understandably, because the 
European m1ss1on organisations 
themselves have a long "colonial" 
past. 
At the same time, Eukumindo shares 
the universal moral and spiritual 
values of Christianity - upon which 
those same "Western" values claim to 
be founded. There is inevitably some 
tension in this position. 
The Document 
There are propositions in 
Eukumindo's draft position paper with 
which those sympathetic to East 
Timor's claims would certainly take 
issue. On occasion, forgiveably 
perhaps in a draft, the writing is 
insensitively worded. 
More than the NCCC-USA 
statement, and far more than the 
Uniting Church, the draft seeks to 
accommodate the Indonesian point of 
view. 
If the Paper is seeking to make an 
impartial presentation of the views of 
those engaged in this crisis, it is here 
that its principal flaw is to be found. 
For, while the authors take care to 
explain the feelings of most 
Indonesians about an issue which 
engages their country's history and 
honour, they do not take comparable 
account of East Timorese feelings 
about their culture and their history. 
Since the majority of Timorese do not 
consider themselves to be 
"Indonesian", it is an omission which 
may, unfortunately, undermine the 
report's usefulness; one hopes it can 
be remedied in a later draft. 
In recompense, the authors offer 
insights into the thinking behind 
Indonesian perceptions of the issue 
that should be considered, even if they 
are not always completely convincing. 
We are reminded, for example, that: 
"When Indonesia decided to make 
East Timor the 27th province of 
Indonesia, both government and 
people acted on the erroneous 
assumption that the East Timorese 
would accept with enthusiasm what 
was dear and precious to them: 
Pancasila, the national language and 
their army of freedom fighters. (. . . ) 
That this enthusiasm had grown out 
of a common historical experience and 
without it was not possible, was 
realized by almost no-one, and this led 
to disappointments and enormous 
communications barriers." 
Again, "The charge of 'cultural 
genocide' . . . which Indonesia is said 
to be perpetuating against East 
Timorese by introducing the 
Indonesian language, is incompre-
hensible to Indonesians. In this 
connection Indonesians point to the 
cultural alienation of East Timor by 
the Portuguese, as shown by the 
'Latinisation' of almost all names and 
the fact that none of the local 
languages of East Timor . . . but 
Portuguese remained the official 
language." 
Important conclusions 
There is much to debate about the 
body of the text - and about the 'way 
of seeing' which lies behind the 
authors' approach. The document is 
more understanding of Indonesian 
perceptions than any previously 
published non-Indonesian church 
statement; though, for its criticisms of 
the Indonesian army, and its implied 
admission that East Timor is an 
international issue, the authors may 
still find they are criticised by 
Eukumindo's Indonesian partners. 
Some sections will certainly be 
challenged from the Timorese side. 
In this context, the document's 
conclusions should be noted with 
special care. In effect, they represent 
the point at which the European 
churches are likely to approach closest 
to Indonesian views on East Timor. 
No Western church body has a more 
intimate relationship with the 
Indonesian churches, none has more 
experience of Indonesia, or identifies 
its own interests with those of the 
Indonesian churches more completely. 
To the extent that there is a gap 
between Eukumindo's conclusions and 
those of the Indonesian church, that 
gap measures the degree to which the 
Indonesian church stands isolated in its 
perception of East Tim or. 
We quote the conclusions in full 
below: it will be seen that the gap is, 
in fact, wide. 
"In the difficult situation of East 
Timor - in many ways tragic and 
politically very complex - it cannot be 
for Eukumindo or similar organis-
ations to produce suggestions, let alone 
demands, for the necessary measures. 
The indigenous churches can do this, 
but even for them it is difficult. 
"Nevertheless, Eukumindo can 
express pleas which have a chance of 
being considered in the future 
reflections of those whose role is to take 
the decisions. Eukumindo welcomes 
any political step which contributes to 
an improvement of the situation of 
people in East Timor. This is the sense 
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in which the following points are to be 
understood: 
"I. We are concerned at the fact that so 
little reliable information exists 
about East Timor. We therefore 
request better facilities for visits to 
East Timor by international 
journalists, church representatives 
and representatives of international 
relief organisations. 
"2. We are disturbed by reports that 
sections of East Timor's population 
continue to suffer lack off ood and 
medical care, particularly in remote 
areas and conflict zones. We 
therefore ask that organisations 
such as the International Committee 
of the Red Cross (ICRC), Catholic 
Relief Services (CRS), Parpem PG/ 
and similar bodies are enabled to 
provide relief in these areas also, 
and that no political conditions 
should be attached to this relief. 
"3. We are disturbed by reports of 
human rights violations against East 
Timorese, of torture, broken 
promises of amnesty, etc. Such 
stances are against the declared will 
of the Indonesian government. We 
therefore ask that ICRC 
representatives should be given free 
access to all prisons in which 
political prisoners are held. 
"4. We are anxious that all possibilities 
should be exhausted in order to 
attain a solution for East Timar 
which is acceptable to all sides, so 
that the armed conflicts and the fear 
of lawlessness may cease. 
"5. Eukumindo is prepared, within the 
limit of its capacities, to cooperate 
with all concerned, particularly with 
all church organisations, to 
collaborate in the resolution of 
disputed issues and to press for the 
provision of the necessary material 
assistance." 




PARLIAMENTARY VISIT TO TIMOR? 
New interest is being shown in the idea 
of sending a Portuguese parliamentary 
delegation to East Timor. We report 
below on the background to this 
controversial proposal, and on the 
newly appointed Parliamentary 
Commission on East Tim or, which 
might play a critical role in Portugal. 
New Parliamentary 
Commission 
After considerable delay, the 
Portuguese Parliamentary 
Commission on East Timor has been 
re-convened and its membership 
agreed. 
Parliament being the third instance 
of power under the Portuguese 
constitution, with the Government and 
the Presidency, the Commission has 
the potential to be an important 
influence upon - and possibly an 
instrument of Portuguese 
diplomacy. 
The last Commission carried weight 
because it had support across the 
political spectrum. Its first report on 
East Timor, published in November 
1986, was adopted unanimously by 
Parliament, adding political substance 
to Dr Cavaco Silva's assertive 
diplomacy on the issue (TL9 March 
1987). 
The new Commission will also 
represent all sides of the National 
Assembly. It contains 29 members, of 
whom 16 belong to the government 
Social Democratic Party (PSD), 7 to 
the principal opposition Socialist 
Party, and 6 to other groupings (PEP-
2, PRD-1, CDS-1, Verdes-1, JD-1). 
Its Chairman will be a senior PSD 
politician, Manuel Dias Loureiro, the 
party's General Secretary. Although 
Dr Loureiro has not had a direct 
involvement in the East Timor issue, 
his chairmanship will carry authority 
by virtue of his position in the Party 
and relationship with the Prime 
Minister. It is widely assumed that Dr 
Cavaco Silva takes a direct interest in 
the direction of policy on East Timor, 
in consultation with the President, 
Mario Soares. 
The UN and Matters of Protocol 
At the end of February, the 
Commission had still to determine its 
programme of work - although 
preliminary discussions had begun. It 
is already certain, however, that the 
principal item for discussion will be the 
question of whether or not, and under 
what conditions, a Portuguese 
Parliamentary delegation should visit 
East Timor. 
Such a visit became a possibility 
when it was discussed in New York, 
during UN-sponsored talks. 
The Secretary General's Report 
(1987) subsequently stated that "The 
two sides are considering the 
possibility · of a Portuguese 
parliamentary delegation visiting East 
Timor with a view to obtaining first 
hand information on the situation." 
This statement immediately aroused 
controversy within Portugal on two 
grounds. (See TL 11, November 
1987.) The less important essentially 
concerns domestic politics and the 
relations of power, under the terms of 
Portugal's constitution, between the 
Government, the Presidency and the 
National Assembly - each of which are 
held to be sovereign. Without prior 
consultation, the government 
(responsible for conducting the talks 
with Indonesia) had no right to involve 
Parliament in proposals about a visit 
to East Tim or. 
It appears now that the apparent 
slight to Parliamentary sovereignty 
was due to mistakes by the Portuguese 
diplomatic mission in New York, 
which failed to pick up the implications 
of the Secretary General's wording. 
It is understood that Portuguese 
diplomats have since explained to 
Indonesia that it is not possible for the 
Government to make commitments in 
the name of the Parliament; and that 
Indonesia will now issue an invitation 
from its own Parliament to the 
Portuguese Parliament, thereby 
restoring proprieties. 
Matters of Substance 
The second ground of dispute within 
Portugal's political establishment is 
one of considerable importance to 
East Timor, and turns on the question 
of whether it is possible to make an 
independent and responsible visit to 
East Timor, when that visit will be 
hosted by the Indonesian authorities. 
Paradoxically, the Portuguese 
political establishment is divided 
between those who assert that any visit 
under such conditions would be 
irresponsibly risky and would certainly 
be exploited by Indonesia to damage 
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Portugal's diplomatic credibility; and 
those who claim, using exactly the 
same arguments, that Portugal cannot 
afford to refuse such an invitation 
outright. 
At stake is the fragile edifice of 
Portuguese diplomacy, erected with 
such effort in recent years. If a 
parliamentary delegation visits East 
Timor and concludes that "things are 
altogether better than we thought" or 
(more likely) is seen by the 
international press to find no evidence 
upon which to base criticism, immense 
damage would be done to the 
credibility of the Portuguese 
government's posture - even more in 
the private talks with Indonesia, 
perhaps, than in public. The 
Indonesian authorities, as is well 
known, are perfectly able to control 
international visits, preparing crowds, 
seeding appropriate witnesses in the 
path of delegations, sanitising and 
smartening up the environment. 
A feeble report from an ill-
considered parliamentary delegation 
would probably lay in ruins the 
political consensus upon which the 
recent recovery of Portuguese 
confidence on this issue relies. 
On the other hand, Portuguese 
diplomats close to the UN process 
recognise that it might also be fatal to 
Portugal's international credibility if 
she was seen to refuse the risks 
involved in making a visit. Having 
repeatedly called upon Indonesia to 
open the territory to international 
observers, could Indonesia make a 
more generous gesture than to invite 
its principal diplomatic opponent? 
Morever, many Timorese could talk 
directly to a Portuguese-speaking 
delegation. In these circumstances, the 
Indonesian authorities are also seen 
to be taking considerable risks. If 
Portugal shied away from this 
invitation, the diplomats conclude, it 
could no longer claim to represent 
neutrally the interests of the Timorese 
people, and would have forfeited the 
moral authority upon which its 
diplomatic influence principally rests. 
The same diplomats also point out 
that, should the delegation find 
evidence to support its criticisms of 
Indonesian rule, its diplomatic 
position would be strengthened 
immeasurably. And why should it not? 
Precisely because so many Timorese 
speak Portuguese, and will realise the 
importance of such a mission, a 
delegation from Lisbon is likely to 
receive information, however many 
precautions may be taken by the 
Indonesian authorities. A successful 
and credible delegation, they argue, 
might undermine Indonesia's 
diplomatic offensive. 
Even if Indonesia is bluffing, they 
argue, the challenge must be taken up, 
if only to open up new avenues of 
discussion in the UN talks, which at 
present stand almost deadlocked. 
Brinkmanship •• and Insurance 
The proposal therefore raised ticklish 
questions for the Indonesian as well 
as the Portuguese state. It is likely 
that, taking advantage of the fact that 
the Portuguese government cannot 
negotiate directly for, but must consult 
with, the Parliament, a quite 
prolonged series of conversations will 
begin, spread over months rather than 
weeks, during which both 
governments will attempt to secure 
favourable arrangements for the visit 
without prejudicing their long-term 
negotiating position. 
Both governments have already 
begun taking out insurance. Cavaco 
Silva has made it clear that any 
parliamentary delegation will not 
engage the government's respons-
ibility - meaning, presumably, that if 
a delegation goes and issues a 
damaging report, the government can 
disown it. He has also stated publicly 
that the government will not give its 
approval to any delegation that cannot 
travel freely, spend sufficient time in 
the territory, or choose its itinerary 
etc. 
For their part, the Indonesian 
authorities have emphasised that an 
investigative Portuguese delegation 
would not be welcomed (TL 11, 
November 1987). Reports suggest that 
the authorities in East Timor are 
already preparing the ground very 
carefully for an eventual visit. 
Transport links are being improved, 
towns 'beautified', the political 
authorities in different districts 
briefed, food and medical stocks 
released to different areas. 
In such manoevring, the Cavaco 
Silva government is in rather a better 
position than most of its predecessors. 
Dr Cavaco Silva's Social Democratic 
Party, recently returned for a new 
term, enjoys an absolute majority in 
Parliament. He has both the time and 
the parliamentary votes to press 
through policy decisions. 
In addition, he appears to have 
reached a working understanding . on 
Timar policy with the President, Mario 
Soares. The two men are reported to 
co-operate closely on Timor affairs. 
Their consensus, if sustained, will be 
important, because the Constitution 
requires presidential assent to policy 
on Timor, and, indeed, currently 
defines the direction of Timor policy. 
Though the Timor clause in the 
Constitution may be amended this 
year, most evidence suggests that the 
substance of the government's policy 
is unlikely to alter. 
The cross-party consensus in 
Parliament is another important asset 
to the government. It enables Cavaco 
Silva to claim, reasonably, that 
Portugal is united behind his 
government on the issue. 
In presenting its case to Jakarta, 
therefore, the government can 
reasonably claim that, given this 
national consensus, it must respect 
public and parliamentary opinion. But 
it is also in a position to press policy 
through, if necessary. 
All of this suggests, reassuringly, that 
no visit will take place without the 
most detailed discussion of its 
modalities and very careful 
examination by both sides of the 
political risks. Portugal has cards to 
play and will have opportunities to 
withdraw. We do not even know 
whether, privately, either government 
seriously believes that a visit is 
desirable. On this reading, there is no 
reason to suppose that talking about a 
visit is the prelude to a diplomatic 
catastrophe. 
Doubts 
A very serious doubt, nevertheless, 
remains in the minds of observers 
sympathetic to East Timor. It concerns 
the Portuguese government's political 
judgement during its negotiations in 
New York. The exact circumstances 
in which the original proposal to invite 
a Portuguese visit took shape remain 
unclear. (The public facts have been 
set out at length by Timar Information 
Subject Memo 1 of 1988.) According 
to some analysts, however, the 
Portuguese government was 
astonishingly cavalier in taking the 
idea forward last year when it was first 
raised. Though it requires just a 
moment's thought to appreciate the 
implications such a visit might have for 
Portugal's long-term diplomacy, it is 
confidently stated by some sources 
that the government was ready to press 
forward at speed with a visit towards 
the end of last year, and made no 
attempt to define the delegation's terms 
of reference or the conditions under 
which a visit would take place. 
Those who report this, claim that the 
fault lay principally with the 
Portuguese diplomatic mission in New 
York, which has made numerous 
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mistakes and in general failed to 
promote Portugal's views on East 
Timar adequately within the United 
Nations. Senior positions at the 
mission are fortunately due for 
renewal, and it is to be hoped that 
more energetic diplomats may be 
placed there. 
Nevertheless, such an astonishing 
failure of judgement should have been 
detected and vetoed immediately in 
Lisbon. If true, the whole incident 
suggests that Lisbon fundamentally 
underestimates the quality of 
Indonesian negotiation. The reports 
have sent alarm bells ringing among 
observers of Portuguese diplomacy on 
Timar - and help to explain why some 
parliamentarians have argued recently 
that, if plans for a visit do go forward, 
President Soares' approval will be 
critical. Why? Because the Presidency 
is the last political institution in 
Portugal which is not controlled by 
Cavaco Silva's government. He will 
be expected to guarantee that proper 
and defensible arrangements have 
been made.• 
United States 
Senator Durenberger and Congress-
man Tony Hall continue to raise the 
issue of East Timor in the United 
States Senate and Congress. At the 
beginning of February they reminded 
both houses that last year 40 Senators 
and 137 Congressmen from both the 
Republican and Democrat parties 
signed letters expressing concern 
about the situation in the territory. 
"By sending that letter," declared 
Senator Duren berger, "my colleagues 
and I wanted to ensure that East Timar 
received international attention to 
help alleviate the suffering in that 
territory. I intend to pursue further 
efforts of this nature on the East Timar 
issue in 1988, not only because the 
suffering in East Timor persists, but 
also because silence can only help to 




Mrs Ien van den Heuvel, who chairs 
the Sub-Committee on Human Rights 
of the European Parliament, has 
issued the draft report on East Timar 
which is being prepared for the 
Political Commission. 
A draft Resolution , addressed to the 
Council of Ministers, has been 
submitted with it. If approved, this 
Resolution will ask the European 
Foreign Ministers "to take initiatives 
that , after a period of transition, will 
enable a referendum to be organised 
so as to permit the population to 
choose freely the future of East 
Timor." 
The Resolution would also "insist" 
that the European Council of Ministers 
should make contact "with all the 
parties directly concerned by the 
conflict" and report back to the 
European Parliament on action taken. 
It calls upon the Commission to raise 
the issue of East Timor in 
conversations with the Indonesian 
government , and to provide 
immediate aid both to the population 
in East Timor and to Timorese 
refugees in Lisbon . 
It calls upon the Commission to 
report on this issue within six months 
of the Resolution's approval. 
The Reference of this 13 page draft 
document, titled Projet de Rapport sur 
le Timar Oriental, is WG(3)'6546F, 
PE 116.178. It is dated 11 September 
1987. (Quotes translated from the 




The annual meeting of European 
solidarity groups working on East 
Timor took place this year on February 
12-13. It was hosted in Vienna by the 
Austrian group, and was attended by 
organisations from West Germany, 
France , Britain, Spain, Portugal, and 
Holland. A representative from Japan 
was also welcomed. 
Mr Abilio Araujo represented 
Fretilin at the meeting. 
The next meeting will be held early 




In October, the Inter-Parliamentary 
Union again voted in favour of a 
resolution expressing concern about 
the situation in East Timor. 
Voting at the IPU's 78th Conference, 
the resolution was passed by a large 
majority (791 in favour, 122 against , 
207 abstentions). 
More significantly, the 1987 Meeting 
was held in Bangkok, in the heart of 
Southeast Asia , in the capital of 
Thailand which is a member state of 
the Association of South East Asian 





At the beginning of October, Lisbon 
hosted a meeting for members of the 
commission which oversees the Lome 
Convention - an aid and development 
consortium involving governments of 
the European Community and a large 
number of African, Caribbean and 
Pacific nations (the ACP countries). 
On October 1, the conference 
unanimously approved a strong 
resolution on the issue of East Timar. 
It was put forward by a cross-party 
group of Portuguese deputies in the 
European Parliament and 
representatives of the Portuguese-
speaking African countries. 
The resolution will now be placed for 
approval before all the governments 
which are signatory to the Lome 
Convention, members of the 
European Commission, and the ACP/ 
EEC Council of Ministers . 
We reprint the text (which we have 
translated from the French). 
"The Round Table Conference of 
ACP-EEC Partners, meeting in 
Lisbon (Portugal) from September 28 
to October 2 1987, 
A. considering that the Round Table 
Conference of ACP-EEC partners is 
meeting in Portugal (Lisbon), a 
member State of the EEC and the 
Lome Convention, with historic 
responsibilities towards East Timor 
which are enshrined in its constitution, 
B. considering the existence of aid 
agreements between the EEC and the 
member States of ASEAN, to which 
Indonesia belongs, 
C. considering that the different Lome 
Conventions are inspired by the 
universal principal of self-
determination and the independence 
of peoples, 
D. taking note of the consensus of 
views reached by the Portuguese 
authorities and the authorities of the 
five Portuguese-speaking African 
countries on the question of East 
Timor, 
1. condemns the illegal and illegitimate 
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occupation of East Timor by 
Indonesia; 
2. reaffirms the inalienable right of 
East Timor's people to self-
determination and independence; 
3. invites the interested parties to 
resolve the question of East Timor 
within the framework and according 
to the principles of the United Nations 
Charter; 
4. instructs (the Conference) co-
presidents to transmit this resolution 
to the ACP-EEC Council of Ministers, 
to the Commission and to the 
governments of States which have 
signed the Lome Convention." 
Approved unanimously. 
Australia 
Agencies Urge Independent 
Inquiry 
The latest issue of East Timar Report 
(issue 12, November 1987) highlights 
a major new international campaign 
to gather support for an independent, 
international inquiry into East Timor. 
The proposal was originally launched 
by Mr James Dunn, who used to be the 
Australian Consul in Dili and is the 
author of Tim or, A People Betrayed 
(Jacaranda Press, 1983). In 
September, his initiative received 
official support from the Australian 
Council for Overseas Aid (ACFOA), 
the co-ordinating body for some 75 
Australian non-governmental 
organisations working in the field of 
overseas aid and development. 
At the same meeting, ACFOA's 
Human Rights Desk was given a 
further mandate to "monitor and 
advise on all aspects of the issue" of 
East Timor, and ACFOA's Executive 
Committee was directed to seek every 
occasion to promote ACFOA policy 
on East Timor. 
The Enquiry's Brief 
According to East Timor Report, the 
international commission of enquiry 
would call upon experts from all five 
continents, and seek: 
"l. to investigate the circumstances in 
which East Timor was incorporated 
into Indonesia, and especially whether 
any acceptable act of self-
determination has taken place, as 
Indonesia has persistently alleged; 
"2. to examine the course of events in 
East Timor since 1975, with an 
emphasis on the extent to which 
human rights have been violated, and 
on the responsibility for such 
violations; 
"3. to study the present situation in the 
territory in terms of the position of the 
East Timorese people, from economic, 
cultural and political points of view 
and including, if possible, an 
assessment of what, at this time, are 
the wishes of the people themselves; 
"4. to propose, on the basis of the 
foregoing, possible solutions to the 
problem, having regard to a careful 
assessment of the wishes of the East 
Timorese people; 
"6. to examine and report on the 
international dimensions of the 
problem." 
The Commission would be expected 
to contact all parties to the question, 
and to visit the territory, if permitted, 
on the basis of free and unrestricted 
access. International support for this 
initiative is being sought. For further 
information, write to ACFOA Human 
Rights Sub-Committee, 124 Napier 
Street, Fitzroy, 3065 Australia. 
East Timor Report, edited by Pat 
Walsh, is obtainable from the same 
address. 
UK. 
Refugee Children's Fund 
Paul Barbara, who has run a number 
of sponsored protests in support of 
East Timor (see TL 10, July 1987) has 
started a small fund to raise money for 
refugee Timorese children in Lisbon. 
He set the project going at the end 
of last year by staging a hunger fast 
over the Christmas period. 
He expects to visit Lisbon this year 
to make direct contact with the 
Timorese community in Portugal. 
If you are interested in supporting 
this fund, you may address 
contributions to CIIR/fimor Link, 
marking them clearly Timorese 
Refugee Children Fund. Please ensure 
that you indicate clearly your name 
and your address (for our records -





The 44th Session of the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission opened in 
Geneva at the beginning of February, 
and continued until the first week of 
March. 
As reported in our last issue, East 
Timor was returned last year to the 
official agenda by the UN Sub-
Commission on Human Rights, having 
been voted off the agenda in 1985. 
We cited the text of its resolution on 
East Timor, which was passed by a 
small majority after intensive lobbying 
in Geneva. 
Non-governmental organisations 
have also supported East Timor's case 
during the current session. Both Pax 
Christi and Pax Romana made 
interventions, as they did last year. 
Several governments also made 
formal reference to the territory when 
they intervened under Item 9, the 
Right to Self-Determination. They 
included Portugal, France, Siio Tome 
& Principe and Mozambique. The 
Indonesian Ambassador exercised his 
country's right of reply to the criticisms 
that were made. 
Towards the end of the session ,on 
March 8, a Timorese recently arrived 
from East Timor appeared as a 
witness. Mr Cristiano Costa found his 
way to Macao earlier this year. At the 
end of his statement he asked for 
assurances that his family would not 
be victimised because he had spoken 
publicly to the Commision. 
No vote was taken and no resolution 
was presented. Whether East Timar 
will b~ included on the agenda of the 
UN Human Rights Commission next 
year therefore remains an open 
question. The margin in favour of the 
resolution passed by the Sub-
Commission last year was so small that 
there would be a real possibility of 
defeat. If the Session of 1988 can be 
described as a success because Timor 
was mentioned, and mentioned by a 
1 wider range of governments than 
usual, it was nevertheless one that was 
achieved on the retreat. 
Mr Yusuf Wanandi 
Controversially, the Indonesian 
government tabled Mr Yusuf 
Wanandi's name as a candidate for one 
of the five Asian positions on the UN 
Human Rights Sub-Commission, 
which will convene in 1989. Mr Yusuf 
Wanandi is director of the Centre for 
Strategic and International Studies 
(CSIS) in Jakarta, a 'think tank' which 
is very close to the government. He 
himself has long been involved with 
the East Timor question and is 
credited with responsibility for 
arranging most diplomatic and 
academic visits there. 
His appointment was therefore seen 
by many as singularly inappropriate 
to this position. There were objections 
on the general ground that this was a 
blatently political selection; and on the 
specific ground that he is not an 
independent witness in regard to East 
Timor indeed has actively 
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campaigned in support of his 
government's views. 
In the event, his candidature was not 
successful; he was pipped at the post 
for the last Asia seat by the candidate 




The Christian Reflection on East 
Timor, already available in English, 
Portuguese, German and French, has 
now been published in Japanese, by 
the Catholic Commission for Justice 
& Peace of the Bishops' Conference 
of Japan. 
CIIR has received new 
endorsements from a number of 
countries to those made public in 
previous issues of Timor Link. 
More are expected from Asia and 
the Pacific following the recent Asia-
Pacific Consultation on East Timor, 
reported elsewhere in this issue. 
Among those who have given us 
permission to publish their names are: 
the Centre for the Progress of Peoples, 
Hong Kong; Professor R.C. Willis, 
Professor of Spanish and Portuguese 
Studies at the University of 
Manchester, UK; K. Lloyd, 
Nottingham, UK; Ramon E. 
Castaneda, New York, USA; Mr and 
Mrs Campagnolo, Portugal; Fr Ton 
Zwart, Philippines; the Christian 
Campaign for the Abolition of 
Torture, Mulhouse, France; and Mr 
Samuel Keller, Austria. 
We have also received many 
signatures from individuals and groups 
in Japan. They include: Emi Yokota, 
Yoshie Sakaguchi, Yoko Nakamura, 
Tsunejiro Oshita, Shoko Ohnung, 
Kyoko Nichishita, all from Nagoya; 
Nagoya Catholic Commission for 
Justice & Peace; The Nagoya 
Association for East Timor; Keiko 
Niwa, Aichi; the Kin-no Kai, a group 
of Buddhists in Nagoya; the Sasashima 
Daily Workers Labour Union in 
Inazawa, Aichi; Akira Uziie, Sendai. 
The Reflection was made public 
following the third European Christian 
Consultation on East Timor, held in 
Geneva at the beginning of 1987. It 
sought to render public the sense of 
concern which is widely felt in 
Christian circles. Rather than being a 
"final" statement, however, it was 
written in order to stimulate discussion 
and more open debate among all 
denominations in the Christian 
churches. That debate has continued 
to amplify . We report on the latest 
developments in this issue. 
If you wish to read the Reflection, 
write to Timar Link at CUR (English, 
French), A Paz e Possivel em Timor 
Leste, Lisbon, Portugal (Portuguese); 
the German Catholic Justice & Peace 
Commission, Kaiserstrasse 163, D-
5300 Bonn 1. RFA (German); or the 
Catholic Justice & Peace Commission 
of Japan, 10-1 Rokubanchu Chiyoda-
ku Tokyo 102, Japan (Japanese). 
If you then want to support the 
appeal which is made in its pages, you 
are still most welcome to do so. The 
Consultation group does not expect 
anyone to sign who does not wish, or 
cannot do so. What we ask, and hope, 
is that people will show their concern 
in any and every way they feel to be 
appropriate for them. • 
Refugee Video 
Cf SET Newsletter reports that a video 
is now available telling the story of the 
East Timorese refugee community in 
Australia. 
"The Shadow over East Timar" was 
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shot in 1987 by Denis Freney, James 
Kestover and Mandy King. We assume ! 
it is in English, and it can be obtained 
do CISET if you write to PO Box 





You received no copy of Timar 
Link in December. We would like 
to apologise for any inconvenience 
this may have caused. We hope this 
double issue will be some 
compensation. 
The default was due to sudden and 
unforeseeable pressure of work on 
CUR's Asia staff. 
NEW SUBSCRIPTIONS 
Please note that with this issue we 
begin a new subscription. The cost 
is to remain the same as in 1987. 
There will be no increase. All 
subscriptions will run from January 
to December. 
To subscribe, please complete and 
sign the loose flyer enclosed with 
this issue and return it to CUR, with 
your payment. Cheques should be 
made out to CUR. 
COMMENTS 
If you wish to continue to receive 
the newsletter, can we also ask you 
to consider filling in the comment 
box. We want to know which 
sections of East Timor Link are 
useful to you, and what you don't 
like. Who reads it? How often? 
Every page? Please help to give us 
an idea. 
CANCELLATIONS 
If you do not wish to continue to 
receive East Timor Link, may we 
particularly ask you to let us know. 
This will save us expense, and save 
you time and irritation. Thank you. 
Timor Link is published at least 
four times a year by the Catholic 
Institute for International 
Relations, in association with A Paz 
e Possivel em Timor Leste in 
Portugal. 
We invite readers to make a 
subscription towards our costs, of 
£5.00 for individuals and £10.00 for 
institutions. All subscriptions run 
from January to December. 
We welcome correspondence. 
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